



Gaza Strip Targeted Analyses, along with Gaza Strip Food Supply reports, are produced as part of special FEWS NET reporting in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Past Targeted Analyses and Food Supply reports are available on [FEWS NET's Gaza page](#). The next Targeted Analysis will provide an update on acute food insecurity outcomes in Gaza, drawing from this report and other available sources of evidence. FEWS NET does not have an operational presence in Gaza, meaning its approach to monitoring and mapping acute food insecurity in Gaza differs from that in its established [reporting countries](#). The analytical framework and methods of analysis are consistent with project-wide approaches.

Gaza food supply assessment, as of June 30, 2024

Key Messages

- Available data for June show a likely decrease in the volume of food entering Gaza compared to May. Though data limitations add increased uncertainty in estimations this month, anecdotal reports also indicate decreased inflows.
- Security and logistical challenges dispatching supplies from the border have resulted in a significant backlog at border points that has only increased since May. As of June 20, the Palestinian side of Kerem Shalom [had reached full capacity with 1,200 truckloads awaiting collection](#), resulting in severe congestion and preventing the transportation of additional cargo. As of June 30, an estimated 1,577 trucks were stuck on the Egyptian side at Al Arish. Though an estimated count is unavailable, large amounts of supplies also remain in the staging areas for Erez crossing and the U.S. military pier.
- An estimated 16,850-27,728 MT of food entered Gaza in June, compared to an estimated 28,400-30,400 MT in May. The breakdown of food by entry point for June is as follows: approximately 7,716-8,528 MT through Kerem Shalom crossing; 248 MT via air drops; anywhere from 4,204-14,266 MT through the Erez crossings; and 4,686 MT via the direct maritime corridor. Limitations in the data for Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings add uncertainty to the totals for this month.
- The Rafah gate remained closed in June, and the majority of the food entering Gaza continued to be transported by trucks via the Kerem Shalom crossing in the south. In June, an average 28 humanitarian trucks entered Kerem Shalom per day for a total of 555 trucks carrying an estimated total of 7,716-8,528 MT of food. Israel paused commercial entries in early June to better facilitate humanitarian trucks, and available data shows no commercial trucks through June 11.
- Data for truck entries through Erez crossing is incomplete and varies between sources from a low of 300 trucks to a high of 1,019. Without manifest data an average of 14 MT of food per truck was used to estimate a broad range between 4,204 and 14,266 MT of food through Erez in June.
- The U.S. military pier was operational for 16 days in June, during which time 5,206 MT of supplies were delivered. Full manifest data is not yet available for this cargo, so in the interim FEWS NET is estimating 4,686 MT of food delivered. Seven air drops occurred in June according to publicly available information, delivering an estimated 248 MT of food. In May, 19 air drops delivered 820 MT, and 44 air drops delivered 2,004 MT in April.
- Insecurity, damage to roads, and risks from military operations continue to significantly hinder the movement of food within Gaza. Looting on the road from Kerem Shalom has reduced the flow of goods to southern and central Gaza, and access constraints are the primary reason that many humanitarian warehouses are non-operational. In June, UN officials informed Israel that it [may be forced to suspend its humanitarian operations in Gaza if the targeting of aid workers does not cease](#).
- Severe shortages in food availability across Gaza, particularly in the north, were reported by multiple sources. While some markets were reported to have improved stocks, many Gazans cannot afford to purchase food at current prices. The overall CPI rose by 36.23 percent month on month in May, driven by a 3.24 percent increase in the food price index.

Data Challenges for Supply Estimates

The Gaza Strip Food Supply reports aim to aggregate and analyze available data to provide monthly updates on the food supply within Gaza. However, persistent and evolving challenges in data availability, timing, and quality limit the completeness and precision of this analysis. Four main challenges complicate the estimation of food supply in Gaza. First, given limited humanitarian access, disrupted communication networks for transmitting and collecting data, security concerns for local staff, and repeated displacement of humanitarian operations, few agencies are able to collect information in Gaza, limiting market data of all kinds (truck entries, agricultural updates, pricing, etc.). Second, insufficiently detailed data requires FEWS NET and other agencies to make assumptions in order to estimate metric ton (MT) totals for food. Key gaps include a lack of aggregation by food and non-food deliveries, commercial and humanitarian cargo, entry gate, and metric tonnage of food delivered and food type. Third, data sources and availability continue to shift, and analysis and reporting must be adjusted accordingly (e.g., the cessation of UNRWA reporting commercial trucks). Finally, though the calculations produce a reasonable estimate for food *entry* into Gaza, analyzing this does not represent the available food supply for Gazans. Given security, logistical, and distribution challenges, significant amounts of food remain in storage and staging areas at the crossing points and cannot be considered part of the effective food supply. In addition, there is currently insufficient market monitoring data to assess household financial access to commercial foods, or distribution and sale of foods within Gaza.

FEWS NET continues to work with partners to obtain available data. FEWS NET is also currently launching phone surveys in Gaza focused on filling key information gaps and will share results in subsequent reports.

Supply Overview

An estimated 16,850-27,728 MT of food entered Gaza in June, compared to an estimated 28,400-30,400 MT in May. The breakdown of food by entry point for June is as follows: approximately 7,716-8,528 MT through Kerem Shalom crossing; 248 MT via air drops; anywhere from 4,204-14,266 MT through the Erez crossings; and 4,686 MT via the direct maritime corridor. Limitations in the data for Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings add uncertainty to the totals for this month.

Overland Shipments


Truck Entry via Kerem Shalom and Rafah Crossings

Through the end of May 2024, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) collected and published manifest data for all trucks entering Gaza through the southern Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings. As the most complete and consistent dataset since the start of the conflict, this served as the primary data source for estimating food entering through these two gates. Kerem Shalom and Rafah have been the entry point for the majority of food and supplies into Gaza since October 7, 2023.

As detailed in the [May Supply Report](#), following expanded military operations in Rafah, the UN was unable to continue to monitor commercial trucks entering through Kerem Shalom after May 5, and the Rafah gate was closed. UNRWA data for Kerem Shalom in May and June includes only humanitarian trucks entering Gaza. In addition, the UN has warned of delays in making data available. As of July 1, data are available only through June 25. With these constraints in mind, in June 2024 there was an average of 28 humanitarian food trucks entering per day, signifying a 47 percent decrease compared to May. Humanitarian food trucks in June have continued to carry an average of 14-15 MT of food per truck, which has remained relatively steady across each month.

In June, 555 humanitarian trucks carrying food or mixed items (Table 1) entered Gaza through Kerem Shalom bringing approximately 7,716-8,528 MT of food. Figure 1 below shows the trend analysis for the estimated MT of food delivered using available UNRWA data. The significant reduction reflects both the absence of commercial trucks in the data and a reduction in flow of humanitarian trucks reported. Based on a review of manifest data, FEWS NET still assumes that a significant amount of the food entering Gaza on trucks through Kerem Shalom is wheat flour. The methodology for estimating total MT of food entering via trucks remains consistent with [previous FEWS NET Food Supply reports](#).

Figure 1 Estimated metric tons (MT) of food entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom and Rafah from commercial and humanitarian sources, October 21, 2023 – June 25, 2024



Source: FEWS NET analysis of UNRWA data (tracking of commercial trucks not available after May 5).

Table 1 Humanitarian trucks entering through Kerem Shalom and Rafah since November 2023

Month	Food items	Medical supplies	Mixed items	Non-food items	Total
November 2023	1,123	264	144	871	2,502
December 2023	1,621	263	128	992	3,004
January 2024	2,448	379	153	1,056	4,036
February 2024	1,451	53	189	935	2,628
March 2024	2,885	95	233	1,045	4,258
April 2024	3,509	124	127	1,192	4,952
May 2024	1,188	26	30	369	1,613
June 2024	538	15	17	139	709

Source: FEWS NET analysis of UNRWA data

Without UNRWA data on commercial trucks at the southern crossings, another dataset is required to estimate these entries. Throughout the conflict, Israel's Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has shared updates on entry of food into Gaza via their X (formerly Twitter) account. These data, while informative, often lack sufficient details for more disaggregated analysis on type of truck (commercial or humanitarian), cargo (food, non-food, mixed items), entry gate used, and/or MT of food delivered. The use of this information is therefore limited to providing broad estimates of truck entries and MT of food only where more complete data are not available (e.g., early Erez truck crossings). However, with the exclusion of commercial truck entries from UNRWA data starting in May, COGAT has shared a dataset through mid-June with FEWS NET. This has been analyzed in conjunction with COGAT X posts to provide an estimate of commercial truck entries via Kerem Shalom through June 30, along with UNRWA commercial truck data reported through April 2024.

COGAT's data on commercial truck entries through Kerem Shalom and Rafah in February, March, and April was relatively close to UNRWA's reported data. In May, the first month without UNRWA data, there was a sharp increase in commercial truck entries reported by COGAT through Kerem Shalom – rising to 2,854 food trucks. This is four to five times higher than April and March. Estimating the total MT of food using the average 14 MT of food per truck yields approximately 40,000 MT of food through commercial trucks in May. This sizeable increase in commercial trucks would compensate for reduced humanitarian truck entries in May, though as noted below, financial access must be considered in assessing the relative utility of commercial food supplies.

[Israel paused the entry of commercial trucks in early June](#) to better facilitate entry of humanitarian trucks, and COGAT data through June 11 correspondingly shows no commercial trucks via Kerem Shalom (Table 2). Data on commercial entries later in June is not yet available.

Table 2 Commercial trucks entering through Kerem Shalom and Rafah since November 2023

Month	Food items	Medical supplies	Mixed items	Non-food items	Total	Reporting Agency
November 2023	18	3	8	14	43	UNRWA
December 2023	228	0	1	10	239	UNRWA
January 2024	316	0	0	19	335	UNRWA
February 2024	221	1	0	24	246	UNRWA
March 2024	608	2	5	115	730	UNRWA
April 2024	570	1	1	94	666	UNRWA
May 2024	2,854	8	41	323	3,226	COGAT
June 2024*	0	0	0	0	0	COGAT

Source: FEWS NET analysis of UNRWA data

* Data available through June 11 – no commercial trucks recorded.

It is important to note that COGAT and UNRWA data for Kerem Shalom and Rafah have different methodologies that affect how the data should be interpreted, and that has resulted in consistent discrepancies between the datasets. At all monitored border crossings, COGAT reports trucks that have been inspected and transferred to the Palestinian side of the border crossing. At Kerem Shalom and Rafah (the only crossings currently monitored by the UN), UNRWA reports humanitarian trucks that they have collected and dispatched from the border into Gaza, as well as commercial trucks observed entering and humanitarian trucks observed for which the UN is not providing logistical assistance. The result is that COGAT often reports trucks as inspected and transferred that UNRWA has not, because the trucks remain in staging areas and have not been dispatched from the border into Gaza. An additional complicating factor is that differences in trucks used on each side of the border can result in differences in truck numbers; for example, what is counted as one truck by COGAT may need to be repacked into two or more smaller trucks on the Palestinian side and is therefore reported as multiple trucks by UNRWA.

As outlined in previous Supply Reports, these data from both UNRWA and COGAT provide a starting point for developing proxy estimates of MT that have entered the territory – not an exact count – given that several standardized assumptions are required to calculate MT estimates. In addition, significant challenges in transporting food effectively across Gaza given insecurity and access restrictions continue to result in significant food supplies stuck in storage and staging areas that cannot be distributed to Gazans in need. This emphasizes the fact that the amount of food entering Gaza does not equate to the amount available in the effective food supply or being consumed by those in need.

Erez Crossings and Gate 96

In June, COGAT directed most entries through West Erez, while Erez appears to have been largely closed. Data for trucks entering through Erez is less clear than that available for Kerem Shalom. While UN OCHA provides an update on assistance to Gaza, full disaggregation of truck entries by gate is not possible, and a COGAT dataset received by FEWS NET does not cover the full month of June. To build an estimate for food entering through Erez in June, FEWS NET relied on an analysis of COGAT posts on X (formerly Twitter), in conjunction with the shared COGAT dataset, and estimates using the available OCHA information. Since these are not complete tracking datasets and have inherent data limitations (outlined above), these should be considered rough estimates to facilitate comparisons to previous months. In addition, reports indicate that commercial trucks have not been using Erez since May, as reported by [US News](#), as well as at the International Phase Classification analysis and in the Food Security Cluster. Data reported for trucks through the Erez crossing are therefore assumed to be humanitarian.

The two data sources have significantly different estimates for June, with COGAT estimating 429 total trucks and OCHA 1,455 trucks (Table 3). Without data on how many of these carried food versus other supplies, FEWS NET is using a general estimate that 70 percent carry food (given data showing most trucks carry food). This yields 300 food trucks estimated for COGAT and 1,019 food trucks for OCHA. The OCHA data and most X posts did not include information on MT of food delivered by these trucks. In order to estimate MT of food, FEWS NET is using an average of approximately 14 MT of food per truck, which has been the consistent average at Kerem Shalom and is between averages reported by WFP and COGAT for Erez. Depending on the source, available data indicate that truck entries through Erez in June could be lower or higher than they were in May 2024, when WFP reported 898 trucks and FEWS NET estimated 10,894 MT of food.

Table 3 Estimated humanitarian trucks entering through both Erez gates in June 2024

Reporting Agency	Total Trucks Estimated	Total Food Trucks (estimated)	Total MT Food Estimated
COGAT	429	300	4,204
OCHA	1,455	1,019	14,266

Source: FEWS NET analysis of COGAT posts and reports by humanitarian actors.

There were also reports from both COGAT and WFP of entries through Gate 96 in June. COGAT has confirmed that trucks entering through Gate 96 are first inspected and counted at Kerem Shalom. Therefore, truck counts and MT for any supplies entering via Gate 96 are included in the Kerem Shalom dataset and do not require a separate accounting.

Challenges at Border Crossings

One of the continual challenges over the course of the conflict has been the closing and reopening of border crossings which temporarily halts the flow of supplies into the territory. In June, the Rafah border crossing remained closed, with Kerem Shalom operational though hindered by security challenges, and some entries routed through Gate 96. In the north, Erez West appeared to be the primary gate used while Erez was largely closed, following Israel’s plan to use only one of those gates at a time. At the end of June, Kerem Shalom and Erez West were the only entry points consistently in operation (Table 4).

In addition to the closing of Rafah, the remaining gates faced three primary challenges in June: reduced monitoring and reporting capacity, looting and insecurity, and supply backlog and congestion.

Reduced monitoring and reporting capacity

Since the clearing of areas around the Rafah border in early May, the UN [has been unable to maintain sufficient staff presence at the Kerem Shalom to continue monitoring commercial truck entries](#). In addition, UNRWA data on humanitarian trucks has been delayed and is only being updated once per week. At the end of June, the public dashboard for this data was removed for adjustments before reposting. The disruption of the UN’s monitoring capacity has caused a break in the most complete and consistent dataset on supplies through Kerem Shalom and Rafah.

Looting and insecurity

In May there were reports of reduced truck entries through Kerem Shalom and security incidents where convoys were attacked by armed groups. In mid-June, Israel initiated a “tactical pause” in military operations at the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings during daytime hours to facilitate increased movement of supplies from Kerem Shalom into Gaza. Despite this, humanitarian actors report that a continued lack of security at the border significantly hampers their ability to safely move supplies through this corridor. One UN official estimated that [three-quarters of goods were stolen from trucks in one day in mid-June](#). In an [NPR interview](#), a UN Office of Palestinian Affairs spokesperson said they are in the process of carrying out assessments on how to

Table 4		Status of Gaza entry points as of June 30
Entry point	Status	
Erez	Closed <i>Closed after being open from May 1-9. Israel’s operational plan for the Erez and Erez West gates is to use only one at a time.</i>	
Erez West (As-Siafa/Zikim)	Operational <i>Open since May 12. Israel’s operational plan for the Erez and Erez West gates is to use only one at a time.</i>	
Rafah	Closed <i>Closed for goods shipments since May 7. Hospital transfers resumed in June.</i>	
Kerem Shalom	Operational <i>Reopened on May 3 after a brief closure. Route to Kerem Shalom via Salah Ad Din Road is unviable due to high criminality.</i>	
Israeli Fence Road (Gate 96)	Limited Use <i>Limited humanitarian convoys with pre-approved drivers, Rarely used in June.</i>	
JLOTS (U.S.-built floating pier)	Closed <i>Operational from May 17-24, June 7–14, June 19-23, and June 25-27. Closed since June 28.</i>	
Air drops	Limited use in June	

move supplies given a lack of security. WFP has also reported that they are [“assessing alternative routes out of Kerem Shalom.”](#) Another UN spokesperson reported in late June that because of the lack of security, the tactical pause [“has yet to translate into more aid reaching people in need.”](#)

Commercial trucks reportedly travel with armed protection and have had more success crossing the border area. In an attempt to facilitate more humanitarian assistance, Israel [paused commercial entries for two weeks](#) in early June. However, without any change in the security conditions there was not a significant impact on capacity to move humanitarian assistance through the corridor and commercial entries resumed. The [rising costs of security must be factored into the price of goods](#) once they reach markets in Gaza, and the New York Times reported that one commercial businessman has [paused shipments through Kerem Shalom for the time being](#) because it is more dangerous and costly than it was before.

The UN Secretary General said there is [“total lawlessness”](#) in Gaza and referenced the looting of humanitarian assistance, while Farhan Haq, a UN spokesperson, emphasized that “as the occupying power, it is incumbent upon the Israeli authorities to restore public order and safety as far as possible and facilitate safe humanitarian access so that assistance reaches civilians in need.” All actors agree that armed criminal gangs are operating in the border area, though there is disagreement on whether there is also looting by unorganized individuals or households out of desperation.

At the Erez crossings in the north, security challenges do not appear to be as concentrated at the border crossing. However, insufficient security between the border and warehouses remains a challenge with the same result: significant backlogs of food assistance remain in the border staging area.

Supply backlog and congestion

Security and logistical challenges in retrieving and dispatching supplies from the border have continued to result in a significant backlog that has only increased since May. As of June 20, the Palestinian side of Kerem Shalom [had reached full capacity with 1,200 truckloads awaiting collection](#), resulting in severe congestion and preventing the transportation of additional cargo through the crossing since mid-June. As of June 30, 1,577 trucks (81 percent being food) were still stuck on the Egyptian side at Al Arish (Logistics Cluster update).

Reports of food spoiling while it awaits dispatch and distribution from the border continued in June. The New York Times reported from a Palestinian trucking company at Kerem Shalom that goods were spoiling in the heat and that [“people in Gaza cannot find food, but the goods are strewn around here in the crossing. It’s a disaster.”](#) COGAT blames the backlog at the borders on international organizations not improving their [distribution capacity](#), while the UN and other international partners blame Israel for not ensuring necessary, safe humanitarian access as required by international law, and a complex set of rules and procedures that are [constantly changing](#) and inhibit the ability to move supplies.

Moving food from the border and into Gaza is hampered not only by the security concerns at the border, but also by damaged infrastructure, insecurity, and access restrictions once within Gaza, per [WFP reports](#). Continued military strikes and operations across Gaza [hinder supply chains and the ability to consistently move supplies](#).

Air Drops and Maritime Corridors

Air Drops

Air dropped food is a tool generally used for supplying hard-to-reach populations in defined geographic areas because of the cost and limited weight that can be delivered, as well as the inability to control and precisely target distributions to specific households or groups. In April there were 44 air drops supplying approximately 2,004 MT of food to northern Gaza, which decreased substantially in May to 19 air drops that delivered 820 MT of food (Table 5). (Note – totals for May have been updated in this report to reflect additional confirmations following publication of the May Supply Report).

In June, reporting on air drops was not as consistent as previous months. A total of seven air drops were reported this month, amounting to an estimated total of 248 MT of food (Table 6). The [U.S. military conducted](#) one air drop on June 9, delivering 10 MT of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to Northern Gaza. On June 13, [the United Arab Emirates](#) reported 90 MT of aid that left via Egypt was successfully air dropped. Five other air drops were confirmed in news reports or through the Egyptian government

over the course of the month. However, none of these reports included MT of assistance or food delivered. In order to include this assistance, FEWS NET used 50 MT of aid delivered (assumed to include 70 percent food) as a reasonable estimate given air drops in previous months.

Table 5 Publicly reported air drops completed in April and May

April	Total air drops this week	Total estimated MT of food dropped
April 1 – 6, 2024	15	618
April 7 – 13, 2024	13	652
April 14 – 20, 2024	3	121
April 21 – 27, 2024	8	378
April 28 – 30, 2024	5	235
May 1 – 6, 2024	7	322
May 7 – 13, 2024	5	253
May 14 – 20, 2024	2	70
May 21 – 31, 2024	5	175
Total	63	2,824

Source: FEWS NET analysis of public reporting from U.S. CENTCOM, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, and UK governments.

Table 6 Publicly reported air drops completed in June

Week	Total air drops this week	Total estimated MT of food dropped
June 1 – 8, 2024	3	105
June 9 – 15, 2024	2	45
June 16 – 22, 2024	0	0
June 23 – 30, 2024	2	70
TOTAL	7	248

Source: FEWS NET analysis of publicly reported air drops

It is also important to consider challenges related to air dropped supplies that affect their use and distribution. First, some food parcels land in the sea and are not recoverable. Second, it is not possible to track who receives air dropped assistance and any subsequent distribution, sale, or storage. Therefore, it is unknown how the food and other assistance is distributed across the population, who is consuming it, or how it might be supplying markets.

Direct Maritime Corridors

The U.S. military's Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) pier has faced significant operational challenges since it was established on May 17, 2024, as detailed by its changing operational status (Table 7). The U.S. government reported that as of June 24 a total of [6,206 MT of assistance has been delivered since the pier opened](#). Using press releases, and imputing for one date that is not reported, FEWS NET estimates that 5,206 MT of assistance was delivered in June. Complete data for June detailing how much assistance consisted of food is not yet available; for this report, FEWS NET estimates that 90 percent was food based on preliminary reports. The pier was reportedly open an additional three days in late June; however, no data is available for this period. This provides a total estimate of 4,686 MT of food delivered in June (5,586 total MT of food since May) via the pier.

Table 7 Estimated maritime humanitarian assistance deliveries in May and June 2024

Dates	Estimated MT of assistance (food and non-food)	Estimated MT of food (assumed 90 percent of assistance)	Operational Status	Notes
May 17 – 24, 2024	1,000 MT	900 MT	Operational	Estimate based on U.S. CENTCOM report
May 25 – Jun 6, 2024	0 MT	0 MT	Non-operational	Pier damaged in heavy seas
June 7 - 14, 2024	2,500 MT	2,250 MT	Operational	Total aid delivered, as reported by U.S. CENTCOM
June 15 - 18, 2024	0 MT	0 MT	Non-operational	Pier removed due to adverse weather conditions
June 19 - 23, 2024	2,706 MT	2,436 MT	Operational	Total aid delivered as reported by U.S. CENTCOM (655 MT imputed for this time period given total reported)
June 24, 2024	0 MT	0 MT	Non-operational	Closed for maintenance.
June 25 – 27, 2024	No data reported	N/A	Operational	
June 28 – 30, 2024	0 MT	0 MT	Non-operational	Closed for adverse weather conditions.
TOTAL	6,206 MT	5,586 MT		

Source: FEWS NET analysis of U.S. CENTCOM press releases and news reports

The U.S. military [reported an operational high, moving about 800 pallets](#) (roughly 40 trucks) of humanitarian aid daily to Gaza via the temporary pier in late June. However, operational challenges continued as the pier was not operational until June 7 following damage and was then removed in mid-June in anticipation of adverse weather conditions. The pier was then closed for maintenance on June 24 and removed again due to weather conditions on June 28. Even when operational, the pier's [capacity of only 90 truckloads per day](#) cannot manage the volumes needed to compensate for the loss of capacity from closed land crossings. The maritime corridor's effectiveness is further reduced by a multi-step inspection process. [Aid must first be inspected in Cyprus](#) before reaching Gaza, where it still faces Israeli checkpoints, particularly when moving to northern areas.

As covered in the [May Supply Report](#), partners faced challenges safely moving delivered assistance to warehouses and distributing food to beneficiaries. This continued in June, and on June 9, WFP [suspended aid collections](#) from the pier due to security concerns. This contributed to a growing backlog of undistributed aid on the shore. The majority of food delivered via the pier [remains in storage nearby](#), with CNN reporting that over [6,000 pallets](#) of aid were stacked onshore awaiting pickup as of June 25. Though WFP's participation in [moving goods continues to be on hold](#), the UN agency supported [a one-time operation on June 29 to clear aid from the beach into warehouses to "avoid spoilage."](#)


Given the limited effectiveness of the military pier to date, there are reports that the U.S. government is [considering not reattaching the pier](#) if logistical and security challenges are not addressed to facilitate the flow of assistance to Gazans in need. Initially slated to operate until September, military officials have indicated it may cease operations [as soon as July](#). The challenges moving assistance from the pier reflect the broader challenges across Gaza with the complexities involved in aid delivery. This has a knock-on effect for assessing the amount of food available to Gazans, as much of the food assistance that has entered Gaza remains in warehouses while partners are unable to safely distribute food to those in need.

A WHO regional official stated on June 24 that the pier is [insufficient for delivering the aid needed and that focus should be placed on the land entry routes](#).

Internal Supply Challenges

The process of delivering food aid within Gaza continues to face severe challenges, with recent reports highlighting the persistent obstacles to effective distribution. Significant portions of Gaza are deemed high-risk (Figure 2), and alternative routes from Kerem Shalom are denied access by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) or are unusable due to hostilities. These constraints are compounded by widespread infrastructure destruction, particularly affecting transportation networks. [Satellite imagery analysis](#) estimates that approximately 65 percent of Gaza's road network has been damaged, significantly impacting aid distribution and limiting access to certain areas, particularly North Gaza and Khan Younis.

Between [June 1 and June 27](#), only 49 percent of planned humanitarian assistance missions to northern Gaza were facilitated, while in southern Gaza, 71 percent were facilitated with 5 percent denied, 11 percent impeded, and 13 percent cancelled. Logistical challenges persist, with the approval process for aid convoys taking nearly a month on average. Even with approval, convoys face dangerous journeys and prolonged waits at checkpoints. The journey from Rafah to Gaza City [now takes over 6 hours](#), compared to one hour pre-conflict. On [June 23](#), a humanitarian convoy was delayed for over 13 hours at an Israeli military checkpoint, exposing it to the risk of crossfire. In Khan Younis, a resident who had fled Rafah told



the BBC that [no humanitarian food assistance had reached them in twenty days](#), highlighting how logistical challenges combined with population displacement have severely limited populations’ access to assistance.

Warehousing operations have been significantly impacted as well. A [recent storage capacity mapping](#) exercise by the Logistics Cluster indicated that 62 percent (35 of 76) of warehouses are non-operational. More than half of the remaining operational capacity is concentrated in Deir Al-Balah, with one warehouse in Gaza City and one in northern Gaza. The primary reason for warehouses being listed as non-operational was access constraints. This shortage of safe storage options necessitates rapid aid distribution upon arrival, increasing the risk of spoilage for perishable items.


The security situation remains volatile, with frequent military operations leading to civilian casualties and further displacement. Humanitarian sites have been directly impacted, with at least 435 attacks on schools serving as temporary shelters for displaced persons [reported between October 2023 and June 2024](#). [Recent events](#) surrounding the U.S. humanitarian pier in Gaza have further complicated the existing challenges facing food aid distribution in the region. On [June 8](#), despite following deconfliction procedures, two WFP warehouses were struck by rockets, coinciding with an Israeli military operation in Nuseirat refugee camp that killed 274 Palestinians. This incident [resulted in WFP pausing aid shipments](#) through the U.S.-built pier.

Continued attacks on humanitarian workers in Gaza have led to concerns about the potential for suspensions in aid. In early June, UN officials informed Israel that it [may be forced to suspend its humanitarian operations in Gaza if the targeting of aid workers does not cease](#). UNRWA and other UN agencies, which reportedly reached 766,503 people with food assistance in [June 2024](#), are the primary coordinators of aid distribution networks within Gaza. Their suspension would result in a significant reduction in aid volume, disruption of established distribution routes, loss of coordination with local partners, and reduced ability to reach vulnerable populations.

Agriculture

The majority of information available on agriculture in Gaza in June comes from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The latest [UNOSAT-FAO satellite analysis, published on June 12](#), examined cropland data through May 2024 and estimated that 57 percent of permanent cropland was damaged and that “crop health and density [...] appears to have substantially declined” compared to the previous seven years (Table 8; Annex B). The assessment attributes this to “conflict-related operations, including razing, heavy vehicle movement, bombing, and shelling.” The images also suggested a 30 percent increase in the proportion of cropland damaged since the April assessment, and “a notable rise in the destruction of orchards and other trees, field crops and vegetables in the Gaza Governorate.”

FAO assessed damage to agricultural wells during the conflict using high-resolution satellite imagery ranging from January through May 16, and [estimated that approximately 46 percent of wells were damaged](#) (Figure 3). FAO also estimated that of key agricultural infrastructure, “[537 home barns, 484 broiler farms, 397 sheep farms, and 256 agricultural warehouses](#)” were damaged. Though exact numbers are unknown, it is estimated that a large share of meat and dairy livestock have been slaughtered, consumed, damaged, or lost. FAO continues to work to distribute 500 tons of fodder to support remaining livestock.



The scale of cropland and infrastructure damage, combined with movement restrictions due to road damage and risk of active military engagements ([Euro-Med Monitor](#) reports that farmers have been killed trying to reach their land) support FEWS NET's assessment that local agricultural production has limited to no meaningful contribution to the food supply and signals substantial barriers to recovery of productive capacity.

Table 8 Damaged agricultural cropland through May 2024

Governorate	Non-affected cropland (sq km)		Damaged cropland (sq km)		Total area of cropland (sq km)
	Area	Percentage	Area	Percentage	
North Gaza	10.1	32%	21.6	68%	31.7
Gaza	12.4	39%	19.5	61%	31.9
Deir Al-Balah	13.1	51%	12.8	49%	25.9
Khan Younis	19.0	45%	23.4	55%	42.4
Rafah	10.1	52%	9.2	48%	19.3
Total	64.6	43%	86.6	57%	151.2

Source: [UNOSTAT-FAO](#) June 2024

Markets in Gaza

Market Functionality


Market functionality remains severely constrained in Gaza, in the south and central zones where displacement from Rafah has accelerated the collapse of public order, heightened insecurity, and slowed the movement of people and supplies, and in the north where supply continues to be severely restricted. Due to insecurity and risk of looting as outlined above, it is [difficult and expensive to safely transport supplies in Gaza](#). While commercial supplies are restocking some markets, the resale of humanitarian goods continues to be [reported](#). Where market stocks have improved, financial access has been consistently reported as a challenge for market functionality. The [ILO and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics](#) released a June update that estimated the unemployment rate in Gaza is 79.1 percent, and that year on year inflation reached 153.3 percent in April 2024. FAO estimated income loss for agriculture-dependent households specifically is as [high as 72 percent](#). The combined reduction in employment and price increases "[erode individuals' purchasing power and their ability to meet their most basic needs.](#)"

As of June 22, [12 WFP supported bakeries](#) remained operational including in Deir Al-Balah (6), Gaza City (4), and Jabalya (2), with one of the bakeries in Jabalya able to provide fresh bread to 3,000 families every day. Since May [all the bakeries in Rafah](#) (5) remain closed due to insecurity and a hostile operating environment. In addition to the reduced number of bakeries (currently 12 percent of the number operational prior to October 7, 2023), the shortage of cooking gas is also affecting the smooth operations of bakeries and leading to frequent closures.

Market Stocks

Given challenges related to the data for food entry and movement outlined in this report, compounded by limited data available directly from traders or consumers on market purchases and prices, it is not possible to estimate the volume of food stocks in the market. However, available data indicate that supply shortages continued in May and June.

In late June, WFP reported that despite supply efforts to northern Gaza [there were no fresh vegetables available in many markets \(and where available quality was “very poor”\)](#) and that there was also a [shortage of meat, fruit, and sugar](#). A survey carried out by the Cash Working Group for Palestine in May indicated severe shortages of food availability across all governorates, with canned food the most consistently available and nearly all essential items unavailable in Rafah (Figure 4). Reports in early July confirmed that [the only food available in the north was from humanitarian assistance](#), as no commercial inflows are currently allowed.




Commercial goods were flowing into Gaza through Kerem Shalom in May and have reportedly had more success moving food within the territory with the use of [armed guards](#). A [report from NPR](#) confirmed that commercial goods were contributing to stocking some markets, even referring to one market as being “full again.” However, the same report confirms that prices are “often 10 times higher than before the war, bought and sold on the black-market multiple times”; a trader reported that many families cannot afford to purchase the food. For 80 percent of respondents to the Cash Working Group survey, high prices were the main barrier to market access, an increase from April. The [Norwegian Refugee Council](#), [Save the Children](#), and the [BBC](#) have also reported that despite improved food availability in some markets, high prices make most food and basic necessities unaffordable. A [WFP survey from May](#) found that only 25 percent of households were accessing food from markets and that other sources of food included humanitarian assistance and family member support.

Prices

There is still no public dataset on market prices within Gaza to enable tracking of price variation across markets. FEWS NET is in the process of launching a phone survey to gather spot prices. Traders have reported that costs associated with shipping and importing food have skyrocketed to as [high as 14,000 USD for each truck](#) to cover “transport costs, bribes to middlemen and protection from looters,” compared to 1,500–4,000 USD before the war. These increased transportation costs are then reflected in food prices which are repeatedly reported to be ten times higher than before the war.

Without price data, the most complete picture of prices in Gaza comes from the [Consumer Price Index \(CPI\)](#) data released each month, as well as anecdotal reports of high prices as reported above. The CPI data released each month covers the previous month’s prices.


The latest data shows that the slight reduction in food price recorded in April 2024 appears to have been only a temporary respite as food prices rose again in May 2024. The overall CPI rose by 36.23 percent month on month in May 2024, driven by a 3.24 percent increase in the food price index (Figure 5). In [May 2024](#), the prices of rice and flour remained stable but significantly higher than they were before the conflict. The price of a kilo of rice was 67 percent higher compared to the pre-conflict period, while a kilo of flour was more than 10 times higher (20.5 ISL) compared to before the conflict (1.82 ISL). The prices in May compared to April increased for bread (916 percent), eggs (6900 percent), petrol (1,542 percent) and diesel (5,280 percent), illustrating significant challenges accessing the commodities. The prices also remain significantly higher than the period prior to the conflict for three kg bread (31 percent), two kg of eggs (660 percent), a liter of petrol (2,673 percent), and a liter of diesel (631 percent). Prices of fresh vegetables declined significantly in May 2024 (by 600-3,400 percent) though they remain 76-830 percent higher compared to the pre-conflict period.



Annex A: Market Functionality by Market Basin

Market Basin	Status	Change since May	Key Issues
Gaza City	Negligible formal market function	Same	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informal markets continue to operate after formal markets collapsed in October 2023. Traders are selling on streets from crates, hand carts, and makeshift shelves. Humanitarian supplies dominate the market, with some commercial supplies from Israel which have enabled traders to stock flour, vegetables, fruit, frozen meat, legumes, and spices. Financial infrastructure is still significantly disrupted, and people cannot access their money through banks or ATMs. Four bakeries are currently operational, though fuel shortages continue to limit operations. Over 70 percent of buildings are destroyed in Gaza City, including a large share of shops and commercial and industrial buildings; Gaza City previously contained 46 percent of Gaza's commercial infrastructure.
Khan Younis	Severely disrupted to collapsing	Substantial deterioration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased congestion after people moved in from Rafah is severely disrupting movement, security, and access to the limited informal markets. Infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged, and the remaining structures are under pressure from increased population. The formal markets remain largely collapsed with households relying primarily on the informal market. The inability of banks to move cash has caused a severe liquidity shortage which adversely impacts the ability to purchase essential items. Severe damage to road infrastructure and presence of unexploded bombs is limiting transportation of market goods. Communication services remain limited. Informal markets are primarily supplied by resold humanitarian food assistance and looted goods and food. Commercial food reaches the market but at exorbitant prices (up to 10 times higher than normal); traders are grappling with very high delivery costs including for transport, bribes, security, and middlemen, which have increased the cost to 14,000 USD per truck from 1,000-4,000 USD.
Deir al-Balah	Severely disrupted to collapsing	Substantial deterioration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Six bakeries are operational as of June 22, 2024, the highest of all the governorates. The inability of banks to move cash has caused a severe liquidity shortage which adversely impacts the ability to purchase essential items. Insecurity has increased significantly following the influx of the population displaced from Rafah. Over 40 percent of structures remain damaged, including a large share of shops and commercial and industrial buildings. Market supply is highly unstable, and food supplies consist of a mix of commercial goods and humanitarian assistance. Due to poor communication and inability to contact wholesalers, most informal traders are restocking commodities bought from household excess and looted humanitarian assistance.
Rafah	Likely collapsed	Substantial deterioration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Rafah border crossing remained closed for the second consecutive month in June and insecurity and looting at the Kerem Shalom crossing have significantly impacted the entry of humanitarian and commercial food into Gaza through the south. Military operations combined with reduced inflows of supplies and the movement of over 1 million people away from Rafah has likely resulted in the collapse of the market system. Little to no information on markets in Rafah is available and as of mid-June, UNRWA estimated that around 65,000 people remained in Rafah.

Annex B: UNOSAT-FAO Gaza Strip Cropland Damage Assessment



Source: [UNOSAT-FAO](#) June 2024

Recommended Citation: FEWS NET. Gaza Strip Food Supply Report. June 2024.