



*Gaza Strip Food Supply Reports, along with Gaza Strip Targeted Analyses, are produced as part of special FEWS NET reporting in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Past Targeted Analyses and Food Supply reports are available on [FEWS NET's Gaza page](#). The next Targeted Analysis will provide an update on acute food insecurity outcomes in Gaza, drawing from this report and other available sources of evidence. FEWS NET does not have an operational presence in Gaza, meaning its approach to monitoring and mapping acute food insecurity in Gaza differs from that in its established reporting countries. The analytical framework and methods of analysis are consistent with project-wide approaches.*

## Gaza food supply assessment, as of May 2024


### Key Messages

- Available data suggest a significant decrease in the volume of food entering Gaza in May 2024 relative to April. Some data limitations, especially the lack of information regarding commercial truck entries at southern crossings, suggest FEWS NET's May 2024 supply estimate may be slightly underestimated. In the June 2024 Gaza Food Supply Report, FEWS NET will update the May 2024 supply estimate with any newly available data and information.
- An estimated 28,400-30,400 MT of food entered Gaza in May, down from an estimated 57,000-59,000 MT in April. The breakdown of food entering in May by entry point is as follows: approximately 16,000-18,000 MT through Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings; 505 MT via air drops; 10,894 MT through Erez crossings; and 1,000 MT via the direct maritime corridor. Compared to April, this represents a significant decrease in food entering via the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings, but a significant increase in food entering via the Erez crossings.
- The majority of food entering Gaza continues to be transported by trucks via the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings in the south. However, Rafah crossing was either closed or saw minimal traffic for most of May, while Kerem Shalom had significantly reduced traffic. On average, 106 trucks entered via Kerem Shalom and Rafah per day in May; 62 percent of these carried food, bringing the estimated 16,000-18,000 MT of food into Gaza this month. The full scale of food entering Gaza through these crossings is unclear, as the UN has been unable to maintain a presence for tracking commercial flows after May 5. The lack of data on commercial trucks for the majority of the month suggests total May supply estimates may be underestimated; however, the scale of the underestimation is likely relatively small as commercial trucks have consistently represented a small proportion of vehicles entering through these crossings.
- Available reporting indicates increased traffic through the Erez crossing in early May, following its opening and limited use in April. On May 9, a second gate (Erez West) was opened. Consistent and consolidated data on the number of trucks or total MT of food entering through the Erez gates is not available. Amid various data sources and incomplete reporting, FEWS NET is drawing on the estimate provided by [WFP in its May 29 Situation Report](#) that 838 trucks crossed through northern Gaza in May, delivering approximately 10,894 MT of food.
- In addition to the large drop in humanitarian trucks entering through Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings in May, publicly available information suggests Gaza received only 11 air drops – delivering an estimated 505 MT of food – in May, compared to 2,004 MT in April. Additionally, the United States military's Joint Logistics Over-the-Short (JLOTS) floating pier became operational on May 16 and supported the delivery of over 1,000 MT of aid; however, heavy seas damaged the pier on May 25, requiring over a week of repairs and delaying full operation.
- In addition to lower supply in May, food supply distribution across Gaza remains extremely difficult, and prices remain extremely high. Challenges include a shortage of approved trucks and drivers, conflict and strikes on aid groups, limited storage, and denial or delay by the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) of humanitarian convoys (44 percent of May missions were denied, postponed, or withdrawn). Additionally, increased conflict and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) orders to clear out many areas of Rafah have halted market activities.

## Overland Shipments

### Analysis of UNRWA Truck Data via Kerem Shalom and Rafah Crossings

Since May 7, the total entry of humanitarian assistance via the southern crossings has decreased by approximately two-thirds. A significant decrease in the number of trucks recorded entering Gaza through the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings occurred in May (1,479 trucks) compared to April (2,868 trucks) (Figure 1). In early May, Israel expanded military operations in Rafah following a Hamas rocket attack that [killed four soldiers near Kerem Shalom](#) on May 5. From May 5–7, both crossings were closed. Kerem Shalom reopened, and minimal aid flows resumed around mid-May. Before this escalation, a daily average of 198 trucks crossed between April 1 and May 6, including one day when [nearly 300 aid trucks](#) crossed (a record high). However, from May 7–31, the daily average had dropped to 33 trucks, an approximate 71 percent decrease.



Since May 5, the UN has been unable to maintain a presence at these crossings to monitor and count commercial cargo. Due to the situation on the ground, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has prioritized the monitoring and counting of humanitarian trucks; consequently, data from May 6 onwards only include [humanitarian activity](#). Additionally, updates to the UNRWA truck manifest dashboard may have also been delayed. As a result of these data limitations, the total supply estimate for May through these crossings is likely an underestimate; however, the scale of underestimation is likely relatively small, as commercial trucks have consistently represented a small proportion of total vehicles entering through Kerem Shalom and Rafah relative to humanitarian flows.

Most food and supplies entering Gaza since October 7, 2023, have been via Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings. Between October 21 and May 31, an average of 126 trucks entered Gaza each day. For the full month of May 2024, the average was 97 trucks per day, though heavily concentrated in the first five days of the month. Of the approximately 25,570 humanitarian and commercial trucks that entered Gaza since October, roughly 91 percent contained humanitarian aid, while nine percent transported commercial cargo. Approximately 61 percent carried only food items, while the remaining trucks carried medical supplies, non-food items, or mixed items.

Manifest data for trucks entering Gaza list the total cargo MT, as opposed to a breakdown of MT per item type. To estimate total MT of food entering on trucks, FEWS NET and other agencies must make standardized assumptions about the breakdown of cargo. The analysis below used reported estimates for the weight of pallets and packaging to calculate an average MT of food

per truck, and an estimate for the percentage of food on trucks carrying mixed items, presenting a total MT range to account for assumptions made in the process.

Food trucks entering Gaza in May have carried an estimated 13-14 MT of food per truck, on average. In May, 1,232 trucks carrying food or mixed items entered Gaza through the two southern gates, carrying between 16,000 and 18,000 total MT of food. While incomplete data are likely resulting in a slight underestimation of May food supply, a notable decline in supply relative to April is still expected.

As outlined above, these data provide a proxy estimate for MT, not an exact count, and these data have limitations in their capacity to effectively estimate supply within the country. There are significant challenges in transporting food effectively across Gaza due to insecurity and access restrictions. Both humanitarian partners and the Israeli government agree that significant amounts of food remain in storage or staging areas within Gaza. As such, the amount of food entering Gaza does not equate to the amount on markets or being consumed.

### Commercial Trucks via Kerem Shalom and Rafah Crossings

Between October 7 and late November, commercial trucks were not permitted to enter Gaza. From late November through April,

**Table 1** Commercial trucks entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings since November 2023

Month	Number of commercial trucks carrying:				Total
	Food items	Medical supplies	Mixed items	Non-food items	
November 2023	18	3	8	14	43
December 2023	228	0	1	10	239
January 2023	316	0	0	19	335
February 2024	221	1	0	24	246
March 2024	608	2	5	115	730
April 2024	570	1	1	94	666
May 2024*	63	0	0	14	77
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,961</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>2,259</b>

Source: FEWS NET analysis of UNRWA data

\*No reporting of commercial trucks since May 5; [UNRWA has reported only humanitarian truck crossings due to access restrictions](#)

2,321 commercial trucks, averaging about 22 trucks per day, entered via the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings. This accounted for 10 percent of all trucks during that period. Among these, 86 percent transported food and mixed items, with the remaining 14 percent carrying non-food items.

Between May 1–5, 77 commercial trucks entered through the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings. Among these, 81 percent transported food, with the remaining 19 percent carrying non-food items (Table 1). No data for commercial trucks are available after May 5, resulting in underestimated numbers due to UNRWA's inability to monitor and collect data on commercial cargo trucks. UNRWA has reported only non-commercial, humanitarian truck crossings due to access restrictions. Reports from agencies on the ground indicate that empty trucks from Gaza, waiting to load aid at Kerem Shalom, often face hours-long delays behind commercial trucks carrying goods for sale in Gaza. UNRWA estimates that there are [100 to 200](#) of these commercial trucks daily. Unfortunately, many people in Gaza lack the means to [purchase these goods](#).

## Challenges Entering through Kerem Shalom and Rafah

Aid flows to Gaza have been significantly disrupted by ongoing military operations, significantly constraining supplies. The intermittent closures of the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings have been a [major obstacle throughout the crisis](#) and, in recent weeks, [have been rendered largely non-functional](#). Kerem Shalom was closed on May 5 following a Hamas rocket attack. [On May 8](#), Israel reopened the Kerem Shalom crossing between Israel to handle limited quantities of supplies. However, access to and from the crossing is constrained by combat and exhaustive inspections. Rafah crossing remains closed amidst deteriorating diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, with reports as late as May 24 of [food rotting](#) in more than 2,000 trucks stuck in Arish on the Egyptian side of the border.

On May 24, [Egypt and the US reached an agreement](#) to allow aid to enter through the Kerem Shalom crossing until the Rafah crossing is functional. The volume of aid entering Gaza through Egypt, however, remains critically low, and [access remains significantly constrained](#). WFP underlined access constraints for Kerem Shalom, stating that it is critical for ["Israeli authorities to facilitate pick-up and delivery of humanitarian supplies entering Kerem Shalom; the opening of a border crossing is not enough."](#)

The functionality of the Kerem Shalom crossing has also been reportedly hampered by [obstruction of aid by Israeli protestors](#); various incidents have occurred since January, according to reports from the [BBC](#), [NPR](#), and [CNN](#). The protestors have also worked to stop aid leaving the West Bank at established checkpoints, where blockades have also [escalated beyond obstruction](#) to the ransacking and burning of aid trucks and assault of Palestinian drivers. According to the Guardian, the activist groups responsible for the blockades reported that they are receiving information from [Israeli police and military personnel](#) to facilitate the protests. These actions are [contributing to a reduction in aid flows through the crossing in May](#).

## Entry Gates in Northern Gaza

Available reporting indicates increased traffic through the Erez crossing in early May, up from just a few convoys in April when the crossing was opened. On May 9 an Erez West gate was opened (in addition to the previous gate now called Erez East), which Israel states will help maintain operational flexibility. The crossing in the north is essential for reaching households in northern Gaza. COGAT has no official reporting mechanism for truck entries through Erez but does share periodic updates via their X (formerly Twitter) account. However, the information shared is rarely disaggregated between entry gate or by food versus non-food items, and generally does not list total MT of cargo.

In the absence of comprehensive data on the northern crossings, FEWS NET draws on [WFP's report from May 29](#) that 838 trucks passed through northern crossings in May through "WFP and [the] humanitarian community." Assuming all WFP trucks transported food exclusively, it is estimated that approximately 10,894 MT of food entered through the Erez crossings in May.

## Air drop and maritime corridors

### Air drops

Air dropped food is a tool generally used for supplying hard-to-reach populations in defined geographic areas because of the cost and limited weight that can be delivered, as well as the inability to control and precisely target distributions to specific households or groups. In April, the number of air drops in northern Gaza increased significantly (to almost daily).

FEWS NET estimated the total MT of food likely dropped in northern Gaza from April 1 through May 31 (Tables 2 and 3) based on public confirmations of air drops. FEWS NET's analysis (originally published in the [April 2024 Food Supply Report](#)) has been updated to reflect data from April 26 to the end of the month. Several assumptions and calculations are required to determine the likely MT of food supplied through air drops. For instance, some cargo is listed as total MT of aid delivered and does not include a breakdown of food versus non-food items. In these cases, a standard percentage of food is assumed (70 percent food). Given data constraints, this analysis should be viewed as an approximate estimate, not a precise determination of food delivered via air drops.

On May 11, air drops were publicly recorded, delivering approximately 505 MT of food aid; this represents a 75 percent decrease compared to April, when 44 air drops delivered 2,004 MT. All air drops were carried out between May 1 and 9, just before the US pier was set to become operational. US Central Command conducted the most recent humanitarian air drop. Meanwhile, the last air drop carried out by the [United Arab Emirates \(UAE\) and Egypt](#) was May 7 and contained 82 MT of aid, including non-food items. US air drops contained [25,000 Meals Ready to Eat \(MREs\)](#), with additional aid provided by Jordan. The UK conducted one air drop carrying [100 MT of food in May](#).

Given persistent access and distribution challenges, air drops can provide an important supplemental pipeline of food supply to the north. However, to contextualize the utility and efficiency of supplying food through these means, it is important to consider challenges related to air dropped supplies. As noted in the [April Food Supply Report](#), some parcels can land in the sea and may not be recoverable. Additionally, information on any subsequent distribution mechanisms is unavailable, and it is unknown how the food and other assistance is then distributed across the population or to supply markets.

**Table 2** Publicly reported air drops completed in May

April	Total air drops this week	Total estimated MT of food dropped
May 1 – 6, 2024	7	322
May 7 – 13, 2024	4	183
May 14 – 20, 2024	0	0
May 21 – 31, 2024	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>505</b>

Source: FEWS NET analysis of UNRWA data

**Table 3** Publicly reported air drops completed in April

April	Total air drops this week	Total estimated MT of food dropped
April 1 – 6, 2024	15	618
April 7 – 13, 2024	13	652
April 14 – 20, 2024	3	121
April 21 – 27, 2024	8	378
April 28 -30, 2024	5	235
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>2,004</b>

Source: FEWS NET analysis of UNRWA data

## Direct Maritime Corridors

On May 16, a floating pier vital for delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza was secured to a beach in the region. This temporary pier is part of the US military's JLOTS capability and includes two main elements: the floating pier for unloading shipments and a causeway for transferring the cargo to Gaza's distribution point. Cyprus serves as the staging area for the aid bound for Gaza via this maritime corridor and pier; the aid is screened and prepared before being shipped by large commercial vessels to a floating platform near Gaza's coast. From there, the aid is transferred to smaller vessels that can dock at the temporary pier. Once ashore, the aid is unloaded onto the beach and moved to a marshaling area, where humanitarian organizations take custody. These organizations then transport the aid to their warehouses or directly to distribution points by truck, ensuring it reaches those in urgent need.

Trucks carrying humanitarian aid began moving ashore via the pier on [May 17](#). The initial shipment – donated by the US, UK, and UAE – included nutrient-dense food, plastic sheeting, jerrycans for water distribution, and hygiene kits, according to an [USAID](#) briefing. This initial delivery consisted of over [300 pallets of aid](#) handed over to the WFP for distribution. However, on May 18, the WFP reported that only five of the 16 trucks arrived at the intended warehouse with their cargo intact, as [crowds looted the remaining trucks](#).

After the May 18 truck looting, the WFP suspended distributions for two days, during which the US collaborated with Israel to open alternate land routes from the pier and enhance security measures. On [May 20](#), aid deliveries resumed with adjusted routes, and 17 trucks successfully reached the WFP warehouse without incident. However, a Pentagon spokesperson acknowledged that as of May 21, [none of the aid delivered via the pier had been distributed to civilians due to logistical challenges](#).

Though the precise amount of aid entering through the pier daily remains unknown, the US Department of Defense reported that [1,000 MT](#) of aid had arrived via the pier for distribution by humanitarian organizations as of May 28 (Table 4). On [May 25](#), heavy seas caused the pier to break apart and sustain damage, which will require more than a week to rebuild and repair, further delaying efforts to fully operationalize the maritime corridor.

While sea-based shipments can deliver significant amounts of food, the aid must then be transferred to trucks for distribution and, therefore, still requires safe passage, approval of movement, drivers, trucks, clear roads, and warehousing. While these efforts by international governments and aid agencies to open air and sea routes for delivering food and supplies to Gaza have provided essential food, humanitarian assistance agencies have repeatedly stated that land deliveries are still considered the most efficient, scalable, and cost-effective option for improving food supplies in Gaza.

**Table 4 Total direct maritime deliveries of supplies in March through May**

Date of delivery	Total maritime deliveries this week	Total MT of food delivered
March 15, 2024	1	200
April 1, 2024	1	100
May 17 – May 25, 2024	1	1,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1,300</b>

Source: FEWS NET analysis of public delivery reports

## Internal Supply Challenges

Entering Gaza is only the first step in the complex process of getting food supplied across the Strip. Aid distribution in Gaza faces [severe constraints](#) due to security and logistical challenges from [Israeli military operations](#), [checkpoints](#), and [infrastructure destruction](#). A [petition to the High Court of Justice of Israel](#) presented evidence of a [deliberate strategy to hinder humanitarian aid](#) to Gaza, including [systematic obstruction of aid deliveries](#) and [strategically timed precision strikes on aid distribution sites](#), alongside [bureaucratic and logistical barriers](#). On [April 4](#), [the Israeli High Court issued an order](#) to the government to improve aid access and to provide details on its calculation of aid requirements in Gaza. One week after this ruling, [COGAT announced increased flows of aid and the removal of some restrictions](#); however, the UN and Israel reported different numbers of aid trucks entering Gaza. The UN notes that [COGAT screens half-full trucks](#) which are repacked into fewer full trucks for entry to Gaza.

Extreme constraints on access to internal checkpoints within Gaza are compounding aid supply challenges. [OCHA emphasized](#) that delays at checkpoint crossings, challenges in accessing warehouses, and restrictions on entry to border areas for Egyptian and Palestinian drivers and trucks are significant obstacles to timely aid supply. The delays in aid delivery, logistical challenges from crossing closures, and military actions have led to reports of [food supplies rotting and requiring disposal](#), negatively impacting food quality and availability.

Humanitarian convoys in Gaza face movement restrictions due to the need for permissions from COGAT and road destruction. At the end of May, aid agencies [reported concerns about low fuel supplies which will limit the ability to deliver food](#); only an estimated one-quarter of the fuel needed is arriving in Gaza since the Rafah crossing closed. Fuel shortages also limit the [function of bakeries](#).

The distribution of food supply throughout Gaza is also at risk due to the lack of law and order inside Gaza near border crossings. Numerous aid trucks have been stopped, sometimes forcibly, and [contents have been seized by either criminal gangs or groups of desperate residents](#). Roads and key infrastructure damaged by ongoing hostilities, along with debris and unexploded ordnance, have posed significant barriers. Between April and May, approximately 45 percent of coordinated humanitarian missions in Gaza were denied, impeded, or canceled due to access constraints (Figure 2).

Movement restrictions make it difficult for humanitarian agencies to move supplies from central storage facilities. [WFP reported on May 17](#) that its warehouse in Rafah is inaccessible due to Israeli operations. Operational management of aid delivery has also been impeded by the escalation of attacks on Rafah, [forcing the relocation of the Joint Humanitarian Operations Centre \(JHOC\)](#)

to Deir Al Balah for secure communications. [UNRWA suspended food distribution in Rafah on May 19](#) due to a lack of supplies and escalated Israeli strikes.

Israeli military strikes against [aid convoys, infrastructure, personnel, and humanitarian designated 'safe zones'](#) represent one of the largest challenges to food distribution within Gaza. Since January 2024, [at least 80 documented attacks on aid convoys, personnel, and warehouses have severely hindered delivery](#). Incidents of this type, which have been [characterized by USAID as deconfliction failures](#), suppress the ability of humanitarian organizations to effectively and safely distribute the food aid that enters Gaza.

Prior to the Rafah operation in early May, [the majority of Gazans were sheltering in the south where the majority of food aid was also being delivered](#). The new entry points in the north, such as the US pier and Erez West, do not have sufficient food aid flows to meet the population's food needs and are additionally located far from the current, most densely populated areas.

### Agriculture

By April 2024, [nearly half of all horticultural trees had been destroyed](#) and approximately [45 percent](#) of the permanent crop fields and arable land in the Gaza Strip showed a significant decline in crop health and density compared to the average of the previous seven years, according to UNOSAT. This decline can be attributed to razing, heavy vehicle movement, bombing, shelling, and other conflict-related impacts. A [comprehensive UNOSAT evaluation](#) revealed a 33 percent increase in the

proportion of damaged agricultural land in April compared to the previous analysis conducted in January 2024; there was a notable 30-percentage point increase in the destruction of permanent crop fields and arable land in the Khan Yunis Governorate; and destruction of agricultural land within the Rafah Governorate rose from 11 percent (January) to 43 percent (April).

[According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations \(FAO\)](#), "around 55 percent of meat and dairy-producing livestock in Gaza have been slaughtered, consumed, or lost due to the conflict" and approximately 30,000 heads of small ruminants (approximately 45 percent) remain as of May 4. In April, the FAO delivered [1,500 tons of fodder](#) to 2,450 livestock-keeping households in the Gaza Strip to help feed surviving animals and support the local production of milk, dairy, eggs, and meat. This was the first delivery of such assistance since October 7<sup>th</sup>.


As stated in the [April Food Supply Report](#), most agricultural activities have ceased in Gaza due to the combined effects of massive population displacement, security concerns, the risk of IDF attacks when moving outside specified civilian areas, and damaged agricultural lands. While data on remaining food stocks from local production is unavailable, it is reasonable to assume that the reduction in agricultural activity, combined with the already small contribution of local production to diets prior to the war, means locally produced foods are not currently contributing meaningfully to the food supply.

### Markets in Gaza

#### Market Functionality

The market situation in Gaza is dire, with scarcity of goods and high and often volatile prices, as well as security concerns and COGAT approvals affecting the movement of goods and people. Although no new market survey has been published since March 2024, media reports and anecdotal information depict a highly disrupted market system, with household access to markets constantly changing as populations move in response to military action. In May 2024, over [800,000](#) people moved from Rafah in the south towards Khan Younis and central Gaza, leading to a halt in market activities in Rafah. All previously

Figure 2 OCHA April - May Mission Access Statistics



Definitions for Coordinated Missions according to the United Nations:

Facilitated	The mission is approved by the Israeli Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) and proceeded without any impediments.
Canceled	The mission is canceled by the humanitarian organization.
Impeded	The mission is impeded by the Israeli army and is not able to achieve its objectives fully or partly.
Denied	The mission is denied by CLA.

Source: FEWS NET analysis based on [UN OCHA \(April\)](#) and [UN OCHA \(May\) data](#)

operational bakeries in Rafah shut down [on May 21](#), and remain closed at the end of the month with the closing of the Rafah crossing, due to dwindling supplies of flour, sugar, and other essential ingredients needed to make bread. The 11 remaining operational WFP-supported bakeries are in [Central Gaza \(six\), Gaza City \(four\), and Jabalia \(one\)](#), supported by limited distribution of food parcels and wheat flour. Additionally, humanitarian aid continues to be diverted to the market for sale as reported in the [April Food Supply Report](#). According to a [May 2024 report by the World Bank](#), there has been an estimated 81 percent decline in economic activity within the major sectors, which has contributed to the contraction of the economy and the loss of an estimated 200,000 jobs in Gaza by the end of January 2024. The loss of income for so much of the population limits participation in market activities. The ability to purchase from the market is further constrained by low liquidity [as banks struggle to transfer money between branches](#). Though cash transfers have increased in frequency and value, partners report [that the ability to cash out transfers is concentrated in governorates south of Wadi Gaza](#). Cash access has also been affected by a [more than 75 percent drop in the number of PalPay agents](#), the only financial service provider able to distribute cash across Gaza.

## Market Stocks

Despite the improvements in market stocks in April – associated with the increase in humanitarian assistance and subsequent diversion to the market – supplies remain unstable and unpredictable. The ongoing operation in Rafah has caused a [backlog of 2,043 trucks](#) which are stuck in Al Arish, Egypt, as of May 22, 2024. The damage to market infrastructure, roads, limited commercial inflows, and the constant movement of populations continue to severely degrade the operating environment for markets, including restocking. (See Annex A for details on market functionality by governorate).

## Prices

There is limited data available on food prices in May; however, given the reductions in food supplies described in this report, prices are likely to have increased this month, though severely reduced purchasing power may continue to result in downward price pressures. More clarity on April price and economic information became available this month. For the first time since October 7, the [Consumer Price Index](#) (CPI) declined by 5.4 percent in April 2024, mainly driven by the 21 percent decline in the food price index following the increased supply of humanitarian aid. However, the CPI and food price indices remained 162 percent and 154 percent higher, respectively, compared to the same time last year, significantly deteriorating households' purchasing power. The prices of basic food commodities continued to exhibit high volatility and remained significantly higher than the pre-war levels. The price of 50 kgs of wheat flour remained unchanged in [April 2024](#) but 1,026 percent higher than the pre-war level. The most significant price declines were recorded for eggs (a 5,102 percent decrease) and cooking oil (a 3,760 percent decrease), although the prices remained 350 and 300 percent higher than the pre-war period, respectively. Apart from tomato prices (which increased by 968 percent in April) vegetable prices declined substantially (between 1,935 and 4,158 percent), but the prices remained between 200 and 900 percent higher than pre-war levels. Fuel price changes were mixed: gasoline prices declined by 429 percent while diesel prices increased by 416 percent. However, prices of gasoline and diesel remained 2,367 and 382 percent higher, respectively, than pre-war prices. In addition to the increased market supply of these commodities from humanitarian assistance, depressed demand due to cash shortages could also be contributing to the significant drop in the prices of essential commodities. The [emergence of a war economy in Gaza](#) has resulted in the extensive sale of humanitarian aid supplied to the market by households who sell parts of aid they receive and armed groups who are selling looted commodities. This is evident in the proliferation of commercial commodities in the market labeled "Not for sale."



## Annex A: Market Functionality by Market Basin

Market Basin	Status	Change since December	Key Issues
Gaza City	Negligible formal market function, increasing informal markets	Same	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><a href="#">Informal markets</a> are beginning to operate in mid-April after collapsing in October 2023. Traders are selling on streets from crates, hand carts, and makeshift shelves.</li> <li>Humanitarian supplies dominate the market, with some <a href="#">commercial supplies from Israel</a>, which has enabled traders to stock flour, vegetables, fruit, frozen meat, legumes, and spices.</li> <li>Financial infrastructure is still significantly disrupted. People cannot access their money through banks or ATMs.</li> <li>Four <a href="#">bakeries</a> are currently operational, but fuel shortages continue to limit operations.</li> <li>70 percent of buildings are destroyed in Gaza City, including a large share of shops, commercial, and industrial buildings; Gaza City previously contained 46 percent of Gaza's commercial infrastructure.</li> </ul>
Khan Younis	Severely disrupted to collapsing	Substantial deterioration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased congestion after approximately <a href="#">800,000 people fled from Rafah</a> towards Al Mawasi camp and Khan Younis is severely disrupting movement, security, and access to the limited informal markets.</li> <li><a href="#">About 80 percent</a> of all buildings have been destroyed or severely damaged, and the remaining structures are under pressure from increased population.</li> <li>The formal markets remain largely collapsed with households relying primarily on the informal market.</li> <li>The inability of banks to move cash has caused a severe <a href="#">liquidity shortage</a> which adversely impacts the ability to purchase essential items.</li> <li>Severe damage to road infrastructure and the presence of unexploded ordnance are limiting transport of market goods.</li> <li>Communication services remain limited.</li> <li>Informal markets are primarily supplied by resold humanitarian food assistance and looted goods and food.</li> </ul>
Deir al Balah	Severely disrupted to collapsing	Substantial deterioration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only 11 of the 16 bakeries are WFP-supported bakeries and are operational. The rest closed due to lack of fuel and essential materials. The remaining operational bakeries are in <a href="#">Central Gaza (six), Gaza City (four), and Jabalia (one)</a>.</li> <li>The inability of banks to move cash has caused a severe <a href="#">liquidity shortage</a> which adversely impacts the ability to purchase essential items.</li> <li>Insecurity has increased significantly following the influx of the population displaced from Rafah.</li> <li>Over 40 percent of structures remain damaged, including a large share of shops and commercial and industrial buildings.</li> <li>Market supply is highly unstable and food supplies consist mainly of commercial and humanitarian assistance.</li> <li>Due to poor communication and inability to contact wholesalers, most informal traders are restocking commodities bought from household-excess <a href="#">and looted</a> humanitarian assistance.</li> </ul>
Rafah	Severely disrupted to collapsed	Substantial deterioration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military operations combined with a near halt of inflows of commercial and humanitarian aid through the Rafah crossing and movement of over <a href="#">800,000 people away from Rafah</a> has resulted in the virtual collapse of the market system.</li> </ul>

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